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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-GOoD FAITH, BIG BROTHER, AND You: THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S LATEST GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION TO
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCLUSIONARY RULE. ARIZONA V. EVANS, 115
S. Ct. 1185 (1995).
I. INTRODUCTION
Isaac Evans's wrong-way drive down a one-way street was the
auspicious beginning of yet another chapter in the United States Supreme
Court's struggle with the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.' Arizona
v. Evans' is the most recent in a series of cases favoring the State's right to
search over an individual's right to privacy.3
Since its 1961 landmark decision in Mapp v. Ohio,4 the Court has
created several "good faith" exceptions which narrow the application of the
exclusionary rule.5 In its efforts to avoid exclusion, the Supreme Court has
limited not only the rule itself,6 but also the scope7 and content 8 of the
1. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The exclusionary rule "commands that where evidence has been obtained in violation
of the search and seizure protections guaranteed by the U. S. Constitution, the illegally
obtained evidence cannot be used at the trial of the defendant." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
564 (6th ed. 1990).
2. 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995).
3. See John M. Junker, The Structure of the Fourth Amendment: The Scope of the
Protection, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1105, 1124 (1989).
4. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). For a discussion of Mapp, see infra, part III.E.
5. See, e.g., Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) (admitting evidence seized in
reliance on an unconstitutional statute); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984)
(admitting evidence seized in reliance on a warrant that incorrectly listed items to be seized);
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (applying good faith exception to admit evidence
discovered pursuant to a warrant not supported by probable cause).
6. Junker, supra note 3, at 1123; see infra notes 118-21 and accompanying text. Some
commentators believe the Court's handling of the exclusionary rule is the result of the rule's
political unpopularity. See Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The
Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83
COLuM. L. REv. 1365, 1392-96 (1983) (listing and responding to "modem criticisms" of the
rule).
7. Junker, supra note 3, at 1123. See, e.g., California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. 621 (1991)
(stating the defendant was not "seized" until the pursuing officer tackled him, so the drugs
he discarded during the chase were admissible); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978)
(finding passengers in a vehicle that was searched illegally lacked standing to move for
suppression of the unconstitutionally seized evidence).
8. Junker, supra note 3, at 1123. See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990)
(finding warrantless entry valid, based on the consent of a third party who police erroneously
believed had common authority over the premises); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207
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Fourth Amendment. The "good faith" exceptions are the Court's latest
method to find the proper balance between the rights of the individual and
the rights of the State.
Until Evans, the Court confined the good faith exceptions to cases in
which a valid warrant existed at the time of the unconstitutional search;9
however, the warrant in Evans was quashed seventeen days prior to Evans's
arrest.'0 Establishing a good faith exception for evidence seized in reliance
on a court clerk's computer error," the Evans decision marks the first time
the United States Supreme Court applied the good faith standard to a
warrantless arrest and search.
This note will examine the history of the Fourth Amendment and the
exclusionary rule. It will also analyze the rationale underlying the good
faith exceptions that existed prior to Evans. After examining the facts of the
case and the reasoning of the Court, this note will address the significance
of the Evans holding.
II. SUMMARY OF FACTS
On December 13, 1990, Isaac Evans failed to appear before a Phoenix
justice of the peace for several traffic violations, and the justice issued a
warrant for his arrest.' 2 When Evans appeared in court one week later, a
justice pro tempore quashed the warrant.' 3 However, the warrant was not
deleted from the computerized files in the Maricopa County Sheriffs
office.' 4
On January 5, 1991, Officer Bryan Sargent stopped Evans for driving
the wrong way on a one-way street.' 5 When Sargent entered Evans's name
into the patrol car's computer terminal, he discovered an outstanding
misdemeanor warrant for Evans's arrest.' 6 Based on the existence of this
warrant, Sargent arrested Evans.
17
(1986) (stating that warrantless aerial observation of fenced area adjacent to home was not
an "unreasonable" search under the Fourth Amendment).
9. L. Anita Richardson, Exceptions to the Rule: Computer Error Sparks Latest
Challenge to Evidentiary Exclusion, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1994, at 48.
10. Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 1188 (1995).
11. Id. at 1194.
12. Id. at 1188.
13. Id.
14. State v. Evans, 836 P.2d 1024, 1025 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).





As Sargent handcuffed him, Evans dropped a marijuana cigarette. I"
Sargent and another officer then searched Evans's car and found a bag of
marijuana under the passenger seat. 19 On January 8, 1991, the state of
Arizona charged Evans with felony possession of marijuana.20
Because the warrant was quashed seventeen days before his arrest,
Evans argued the court should suppress the marijuana seized during the
unlawful arrest.2' At the suppression hearing, the trial court did not
determine whether the employees of the justice court or the Sheriff's office
were responsible for the computer error.22 Nevertheless, the court declared
the State responsible for the inaccurate records, no matter who actually
committed the error,23 and granted Evans's motion to suppress. 24
On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court judge
abused his discretion in granting the motion.25 Because the exclusionary
rule was intended only to deter police misconduct, the court held it
inapplicable to a case where no evidence of police department misconduct
was presented.26
18. Id.
19. State v. Evans, 836 P.2d 1024, 1025 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992). The officers found
additional cigarettes, rolling papers, and marijuana residue in Evans's passenger's purse. Id.
20. Id. Evans was charged with knowingly possessing or using less than one pound of
marijuana, a class six felony under ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3405. Id. (citing ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-3405 (1989)). When this offense occurred, the sentence for a class six
felony was one and one half years for a first offense; however, a judge could adjust the
sentence based on the circumstances of the crime. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-
701(C)(5), -702(A) (1989).
21. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1188.
22. Id. The chief clerk of the Justice Court explained the procedure for quashing a
warrant: A justice court clerk notifies the sheriff's office that a warrant has been quashed
and records the telephone call in the court file. Id. The sheriff's office then records the call
in its telephone log and removes the warrant from its computer files. Evans, 836 P.2d at
1025. Evans's court file showed no record of a telephone call to the sheriff's office, and the
sheriff's office phone log showed no call quashing Evans's warrant. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at
1188.
23. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1188.
24. Evans, 836 P.2d at 1025. The trial court found the facts in Evans's case
indistinguishable from State v. Greene, 783 P.2d 829 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989). Evans, 836 P.2d
at 1025 (citing Greene). In that case, a police officer discovered an outstanding warrant for
Greene's arrest when he ran a record check during a routine traffic stop. Greene, 783 P.2d
at 829. During the subsequent arrest, the officer searched Greene's pockets and found
narcotics. Id. However, because the warrant had been quashed eight months prior to the
arrest, the trial court suppressed the evidence. Id. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed,
finding that suppression would deter the police from "failing to keep [their] paperwork or
computer entries up to date, exposing persons to a possible wrongful arrest." Id. at 830.
25. Evans, 836 P.2d at 1028.
26. 10. at 1026-27. The court found no evidence that the Sheriff's office or the arresting
officers were negligent. Id. at 1027.
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The Arizona Supreme Court then reversed the Court of Appeals's
judgment, reasoning that no one should be arrested because of any
government entity's negligent computer record keeping.27  To deter
inefficiency in criminal record keeping, the court held the exclusionary rule
should apply to this case even if court employees were responsible for the
erroneous computer record.28
The United States Supreme Court granted Arizona's writ of certiorari
to resolve whether the exclusionary rule required suppression of evidence
seized in an unlawful arrest caused by a computer error, regardless of
whether court employees or police department employees were responsible
for the error.29 The Court held the exclusionary rule does not apply when
erroneous records are the result of court employees' clerical errors.3"
III. BACKGROUND
A. General Background
Historians agree that the framers created the Fourth Amendment to
prevent their newly formed government from using two of the British
government's most hated devices-general warrants and writs of
assistance.3 While the colonists were concerned with general warrants as
a restriction on freedom of the press,32 the general warrant debate in the
, 27. State v. Evans, 866 P.2d 869, 872 (Ariz. 1994). The court found that, "[a]s
automation increasingly invades modem life, the potential for Orwellian mischief grows.
Under such circumstances, the exclusionary rule is a 'cost' we cannot afford to be without."
Id. Justice Brennan expressed a similar concern in Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 466-67
(1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (comparing a police officer in a helicopter hovering 400 feet
above the suspect's fenced yard with the "Police Patrol" in George Orwell's novel, NINETEEN
EIGHTY-FOUR).
28. Evans, 866 P.2d at 872.
29. Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 1189 (1995).
30. Id. at 1194.
31. NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 13 (1937). For general discussions of relevant British
and American history, see also Stewart, supra note 6, at 1369-72; Yale Kamisar, Does (Did)
(Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis" Rather than an "Empirical
Proposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565, 571-73 (1982-1983); JACOB W. LANDYNSKI,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 30-48 (1966).
32. LASSON, §upra note 31, at 51. General warrants were a powerful censorship tool
used to eliminate publications critical of the Crown. Often issued without probable cause,
they allowed the holder unlimited power to search, seize, and destroy offensive printed
matter. LASSON, supra note 31, at 25-26.
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colonies focused primarily upon the writs of assistance.3 Public furor over
the writs fueled the spirit of independence in the colonies.34
Immediately following the Revolution, four states adopted constitutional
provisions forbidding general warrants.35 Other states adopted similar
provisions prior to the 1787 Constitutional Convention.36 These state
constitutional provisions served as models for the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.37
B. Pre-Exclusionary Rule Cases--The Foundation
The text of the Fourth Amendment provides no remedy for its
violation.3 ' At common law, those who executed illegal searches and
seizures were held liable for damages, 39 and courts admitted evidence
obtained in an illegal search for over a century after the Revolution.4"
33. LASSON, supra note 31, at 51. In response to restrictions on colonial trade outside
the British Empire, the colonies began smuggling operations. To combat the smuggling, the
King issued writs of assistance that allowed customs officials unlimited power of search and
seizure for the duration of the issuing sovereign's life. LANDYNSIO, supra note 31, at 30-31.
34. LASSON, supra note 31, at 58-59.
35. LANDYNSKI, supra note 31, at 38. Virginia passed its provision prior to the signing
of the Declaration of Independence. After the signing, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and North
Carolina followed. LANDYNSKI, supra note 31, at 38.
36. The 1780 Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was the first to use the phrase
"unreasonable searches and seizures." This provision was duplicated in the 1784 New
Hampshire Bill of Rights. LASSON, supra note 31, at 38. Although Vermont was not
admitted into the Union until 1791, it adopted a search provision in 1777. 6 THE FEDERAL
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 3741 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909), quoted in LANDYNSKI,
supra note 31, at 38 n.93.
37. LASSON, supra note 31, at 82. As James Madison proposed the amendment and as
the draft came out of committee, it prohibited only improper warrants:
The rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
shall not be violated by warrants issuing without probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, and not particularly describing the places to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
LASSON, supra note 3 1, at 101. Representative Benson objected and proposed that the words
"by warrants issuing" be changed to "and no warrant shall issue." This revision was voted
down. However, Benson chaired the committee appointed to arrange the amendments, and
when the amendment left his committee, it read as he had'unsuccessfully proposed. In that
form, it was accepted by the Senate, enacted by both houses of Congress, and ratified by the
States. LASSON, supra note 31, at 101-03.
38. See supra note 1 for the text of the Fourth Amendment.
39. BRADFORD P. WILSON, ENFORCING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A JURISPRUDENTIAL
HISTORY 16 (1986). Wilson contends that the common law remedy of a civil suit was the
implied remedy because the British common law applied where no positively enacted law
contradicted it. Id. at 14.
40. Id. at 45. Justice Wilde's decision, in Commonwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass. (2 Met.)
329 (1841), stated this rule as follows: "When papers are offered into evidence, the court
can take no notice how they were obtained, whether lawfully or unlawfully; nor would they
1996]
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However, in 1886, the United States Supreme Court decided Boyd v. United
States4 and planted the seeds of the exclusionary rule. Boyd is one of three
decisions generally credited with creating the rule.42
At issue in Boyd was a federal law that allowed a prosecutor, in civil
forfeiture proceedings, to compel the production of records helpful to the
government's case.43 Failure to obey an order to produce the records was
deemed an admission of guilt.' The majority found that the forced
production of private papers was a "search" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, and the search was unreasonable because it sought
private papers, not contraband.45
The Court held that the admission of private papers seized in violation
of the Fourth Amendment would also violate a person's Fifth Amendment
right to avoid self-incrimination.' Justice Bradley, writing for the majority,
linked the Fourth and Fifth Amendments by analogizing the seizing of
private papers to compelling a person to testify as to their contents.47 The
Court excluded the evidence and declared the law unconstitutional.48
form a collateral issue to determine that question." Quoted in WILSON, supra note 39, at 47-
48. Most state courts, including Arkansas, agreed with this determination. See, e.g.,
Starchman v. State, 62 Ark. 538, 36 S.W. 940 (1896).
41. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
42. Stewart, supra note 6, at 1372. The other two are Adams v. New York, 192 U.S.
585 (1904), and Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
43. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 617.
44. Id. at 619-20. The defendants obeyed a subpoena ordering them to produce their
invoices and records for the court, and they appealed the judgment on Fifth Amendment
grounds. Id. at 618.
45. Id. at 622-23; see also Stewart, supra note 6, at 1373. The government could not
obtain private papers even under the colonial writs of assistance. Stewart, supra note 6, at
1373. Justice Stewart noted that, under the Boyd rule, only "testimonial evidence such as
papers or books-and not contraband, such as drugs or guns-had to be excluded" because
the "exclusion was a by-product of the fifth amendment's ban on compulsory testimony."
Stewart, supra note 6, at 1375.
46. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630-35. In his concurring opinion, Justice Miller found no Fourth
Amendment search or seizure in this case, but he agreed the statute violated the Fifth
Amendment. Id. at 638-40 (Miller, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 630-34. Justice Bradley based his opinion on the English case, Entick v.
Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (1765). See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630. In Entick,
Lord Camden stressed the relationship between the concepts of an illegal search and
compelled self-incrimination. Id. at 629. However, Landynski indicates Justice Bradley's
reliance on Entick was misplaced. LANDYNSKI, supra note 31, at 59-60. In Entick, the
warrant was based on mere suspicion, and, in this context, Lord Camden stressed its relation
to the right to avoid self-incrimination. The Boyd warrant listed specific papers and was not
based on mere suspicion. LANDYNSKI, supra note 31, at 59-60.
48. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 638. The opinion did not make clear whether the Fourth
Amendment violation alone required exclusion. See LANDYNSKI, supra note 31, at 58
(stating that the Court united the Fourth and Fifth Amendments in a "mystical bond" to
exclude the evidence); but see Stewart, supra note 6, at 1373 (stating that exclusion was
[Vol. 18
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Justice Bradley was deceased by the time the next major Fourth
Amendment case was decided, leaving Justice Day to write the majority
opinion in Adams v. New York.49 Under the facts of this case, the Court
found that no unreasonable search or seizure occurred.5 However, the
Court stated that, even if a search were unreasonable, a court could not stop
during a trial to address the "collateral" issue of how police officers
obtained the evidence.5  Therefore, prosecutors could use evidence
discovered during an illegal search. Although the majority attempted to
distinguish Boyd,52 the Adams decision seemed to overrule the earlier case.
The Adams rule lasted only ten years before the landmark decision of
Weeks v. United States." In Weeks, the Court developed and used the
exclusionary rule in a federal criminal trial.' After a United States Marshal
discovered evidence during a clearly illegal search,"5 the defendant petitioned
for the return of his property before the trial began. The trial court denied
the petition, allowing federal officers to retain possession of the defendant's
property for use as evidence at trial. 6 The United States Supreme Court
reversed, ruling that the retention of the defendant's property and its use at
trial was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 57 This decision limited
Adams by giving a person whose property was seized unconstitutionally the
opportunity to prevent its use at trial by a pretrial petition.58
In addition to providing a method of circumventing the Adams rule,
Weeks also established the "judicial integrity" rationale for the exclusionary
rule. The Court found that the admission of evidence gathered in violation
required only by the Fifth Amendment).
49. 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
50. Id. at 594. After receiving a warrant to search for "gambling paraphernalia,"
officers seized other private papers and used them as evidence against the defendant at trial.
Id.
51. Id. at 595. The Court quoted Commonwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 329
(1841), to support its ruling. Id.; see supra note 40.
52. The Court noted that many of the state cases they cited as support for their ruling
had distinguished Boyd. Adams, 192 U.S. at 597. The Court also found that the defendant
in this case was not compelled to produce evidence against himself because he was "not
compelled to testify concerning the papers or make any admission about them." Id. at 598.
53. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
54. Id. at 398.
55. Id. at 393. After the defendant's arrest at his place of business, a United States
Marshal searched his home and confiscated his property without a search warrant. Id. at 386.
56. Id. at 388.
57. Id. at 398-99. This decision differed from Boyd by basing the reversal on the
Fourth Amendment alone; see also WILSON, supra note 39, at 59.
58. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 394-96. The defendant avoided the "collateral issue" problem
of Adams by his pretrial petition. Id. at 398. See also Wise v. Mills, 185 F. 318
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911), error dismissed, 220 U.S. 549 (1911), where this method of avoiding
the Adams rule was successful prior to the Weeks decision.
1996]
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of the Constitution ratified a wrongful act and tainted the entire justice
system.59
C. Broadening the Exclusionary Rule
The first major step toward broadening the rules of Boyd and Weeks
was Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States.6° While previous Fourth
Amendment decisions were based on the idea that because the defendant's
property had been confiscated he or she had a right to its return,6' this case
marked the end of that property-based analysis.62
In Silverthorne, a United States marshal illegally seized the defendants'
papers, and the defendants successfully petitioned for their return.
63
However, the lower court allowed the District Attorney to photograph and
photocopy the papers before returning them and then use those copies to
subpoena the originals.' Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, said the
government could neither keep possession of the illegally seized evidence
nor make use of the evidence at all.65  To allow this to occur would
"reduce[] the Fourth Amendment to a form of words."'
59. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 394. See also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222-23
(1960) (discussing the "imperative of judicial integrity" as a reason to exclude illegally
obtained evidence); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469-71 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law.").
60. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
61. See WILSON, supra note 39, at 81-86. In Weeks, the trial court's right to use the
defendant's property as evidence derived from its right to possess that property in the first
place. The Supreme Court found there was no right to possess the property at the time of
trial because it should have been returned to its owner before trial. WILSON, supra note 39,
at 81. See also James Boyd White, Forgotten Points in the "Exclusionary Rule" Debate, 81
MICH. L. REv. 1273 (1983), where the author asserts that exclusion grew out of property
rights inherent in the "overlapping" constitutional concepts of liberty and property. White,
supra, at 1276-77. "Property was an extension of the person[,]... [which] is perhaps why
the use of one's property in a criminal proceeding was felt to violate the fifth amendment
prohibition of compulsory self-incrimination as well as the fourth amendment prohibition of
unreasonable seizures [in Boyd v. United States]." White, supra, at 1277.
62. WILSON, supra note 39, at 82. But see White, supra note 61, at 1278-79 (stating
that Silverthorne's decision to forbid the "derivative use of improperly seized property...
was a natural outgrowth of the primary prohibition [against using the property itself]").
63. Silverthorne, 251 U.S. at 390-91.
64. Id. at 391.
65. Id.; see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-86 (1963) (holding that
the government could not use confessions made subsequent to an unlawful arrest).
66. Silverthorne, 251 U.S. at 391-92. Justice Holmes noted that this rule "does not
mean that the facts thus obtained become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is
gained from an independent source they may be proved like any others." Id. at 392. Thus,
this case established the independent source exception to the exclusionary rule.
540 [Vol. 18
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After the Silverthorne decision, there was no reason for a pretrial
motion because the Court interpreted the Fourth Amendment to forbid the
government's use of unconstitutionally seized evidence as well as any
advantages gained by the illegal act.67  Thus, although it did not state
explicitly that a pretrial motion was no longer necessary, this decision
seemed to bypass the property issue altogether.68
The United States Supreme Court further broadened the Boyd and
Weeks rules in Agnello v. United States,69 a case firmly establishing the
exclusionary rule's connection to the Fourth Amendment.70 In Agnello, the
Court found a search for contraband unlawful. 7' Federal officers searched
Agnello's house without a warrant, found a container of cocaine, and
subsequently introduced it as evidence at trial.72 Agnello alleged he had
never seen the cocaine, so he could not have made a pretrial petition for its
return.73 Because the search clearly violated the Fourth Amendment and the
evidence incriminated Agnello, the Court ruled Agnello could use the
protection of the Fifth Amendment to exclude the evidence.74 Thus, by
1925 the exclusionary rule was firmly embedded in federal jurisprudence.
75
The next step in the rule's development was its application to the states.
D. The Fourth Amendment and Due Process
The case of Wolf v. Colorado76 applied the Fourth Amendment to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.7 7 However, the ruling did not
require the exclusion of evidence seized in violation of due process. 7' By
67. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391 (1914); see also WILSON, supra note 39,
at 82-83.
68. WILSON, supra note 39, at 82.
69. 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
70. Stewart, supra note 6, at 1376-77.
71. Agnello, 269 U.S. at 33. In a marked departure from its earlier cases, the Court did
not distinguish between contraband and personal papers. See supra note 45 and
accompanying text.
72. Agnello, 269 U.S. at 28-29.
73. Id. at 34.
74. Id. The Silverstone and Agnello decisions effectively overruled the Adams pretrial
motion requirement. See Stewart, supra note 6, at 1375-77.
75. Stewart, supra note 6, at 1377.
76. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
77. Id. at 27-28 ("[The] security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the
police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment--is basic to a free society. It is
therefore implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as such is enforceable against the
States through the Due Process clause.").
78. Id. at 33.
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ruling states could use remedies other than exculsion,79 the Wolf decision
made the exclusionary rule applicable only to searches conducted by federal
officials. Evidence gathered by state officials in unconstitutional searches
remained admissible in feaeral court.80  This was known as the "silver
platter doctrine." 8 The doctrine lasted eleven years until it was overruled
in 1960 by Elkins v. United States.
8 2
The Court, in Elkins, expressly declined to decide whether the
Fourteenth Amendment required exclusion. 83 Instead, the Court focused on
the "underlying constitutional doctrine" established by Wolf 84 The silver
platter doctrine was based on the idea that unreasonable state searches did
not violate the United States Constitution. 85 That idea was destroyed with
the Wolf decision, however, because the Wolf Court found that unreasonable
state searches violated the Constitution. 6 Based on this reasoning, the Court
abolished the silver platter doctrine.
The Elkins majority offered two additional reasons for its decision. The
Court noted the exclusionary rule was an effective deterrent of future
violations of the Constitution and stated that the purpose of the rule was "to
deter." 87 This decision appears to be the first to mention the exclusionary
rule's deterrent effect as one of the primary reasons for its existence.8 In
79. Id. at 30-31. Justice Frankfurter described the ruling as follows:
Granting that in practice the exclusion of evidence may be an effective way of
deterring unreasonable searches, it is not for this Court to condemn as falling
below the minimal standards assured by the Due Process Clause a State's reliance
upon other methods which, if consistently enforced, would be equally effective.
Id. The dissent questioned the effectiveness of these "other methods." See id. at 41-47
(Murphy, J., dissenting).
80. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213-14 (1960). However, this rule was not
without limitations. See Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79 (1949) (holding that
federal officials could not participate in the search); Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310,
314-15 (1927) (holding that state officials must execute the search with the belief that the
defendant committed a state offense).
81. Elkins, 364 U.S. at 208 n.2. The Court in Elkins attributed the term "silver platter
doctrine" to the following phrase: "[I]t is not a search by a federal official if evidence
secured by state authorities is turned over to federal authorities on a silver platter." Id. at
78-79 (quoting Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949)).
82. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
83. Id. at 213.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 213-14.
86. Id. Therefore, "the constitutional doctrine of Wolfoperated to undermine the logical
foundation of the Weeks admissibility rule.., from the very day that Wolfwas decided."
Id. at 214.
87. Id. at 217.
88. Stewart, supra note 6, at 1379. Justice Stewart stated that the doctrinal basis for
the exclusionary rule was left unresolved in his majority opinion. Stewart, supra note 6, at
1379. However, later courts would seize upon the deterrence rationale as the sole purpose
[Vol. 18
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addition, the Court found that the "imperative of judicial integrity"
demanded the exclusion of all unconstitutionally seized evidence.89 The
Elkins decision made due process protection coextensive with the protections
of the Fourth Amendment.9"
E. A Constitutional Basis For Exclusion: Mapp v. Ohio
Overruling Wolf v. Colorado,9' the Court in Mapp v. Ohio92 held that
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments required the exclusion of
unconstitutionally obtained evidence in state, as well as federal, courts.93
The appellant, Mapp, was convicted under an Ohio statute that made it
illegal to possess pornography, after pornographic material was found during
an illegal search of her home.' The evidence was admitted on the authority
of Wolf 95
Although the petitioner argued only that the police officers' unconstitu-
tional behavior warranted exclusion under the "shock the conscience"
standard of Rochin v. California," the Court overruled Wolf 9' The majority
of the exclusionary rule.
89. Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222.
90. Id. at 223. The Court held that "evidence obtained by state officers during a search
which, if conducted by federal officers, would have violated the defendant's immunity from
unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible over the
defendant's timely objection in a federal criminal trial." Id. After this decision, many
commentators remained unconvinced that Fourth Amendment standards were the same as the
Fourteenth Amendment standards. See, e.g., Roger J. Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the
Fifty States, DUKE L.J., Summer 1962, at 319. The Court's decision in Ker v. California,
however, made it clear that the states were required to abide by Fourth Amendment standards
in search and seizure cases. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963).
91. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
92. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
93. Id. at 655.
94. Id. at 643 (citing OHIo REv. CODE § 2905.34). Three hours after Mapp refused
admittance to three police officers who wished to conduct a warrantless search of her home,
approximately seven officers returned and forced their way into the house. Id. at 644. When
Mapp asked for a warrant, an officer held up a piece of paper which Mapp grabbed and
shoved down her shirt. Id. After a struggle, the officers recovered the paper, handcuffed
Mapp, and searched her home. Id. at 644-45. During the search, they found "four little
pamphlets, a couple of photographs, and a little pencil doodle-all of which [were] alleged
to be pornographic." Id. at 668 (Douglas, J., concurring). The prosecution produced no
warrant at trial. Id. at 645 (majority opinion).
95. Id. at 645-46.
96. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). In Rochin, doctors pumped a suspect's stomach against his
will so police officers could recover two capsules of morphine. Id. at 166. The Court
excluded the evidence because the methods of the police "shocked the conscience." Id. at
172.
97. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655. Only the American Civil Liberties Union, in its amicus
curiae brief, asked the Court to overrule Wolf Id. at 674 n.5 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also
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found the extension of the exclusionary rule to state cases "constitutionally
necessary," and the exclusionary rule was thus an "essential part of the right
to privacy." '98
In Mapp, the Court once again based its decision on the relationship
between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. 9 According to Justice Clark's
majority opinion, the two amendments required exclusion of unconstitution-
ally seized evidence to maintain the constitutional right to privacy.'00 The
Mapp majority also found favor with the judicial integrity rationale for the
exclusionary rule.)'° However, later cases did not support this rationale for
the rule's existence.
10 2
F. Deterrence As A Foundation For Exclusion
Immediately following Mapp, the Court's focus shifted from judicial
integrity to deterrence. Stating that deterrence of police misconduct was the
primary purpose for the exclusionary rule, the Court held in Linkletter v.
Walker"3 that applying the Mapp rule retroactively would not serve this
purpose."
In Alderman v. United States,"°5 the Court determined that only those
whose rights were violated by an unconstitutional search have standing to
suppress the evidence.' 6 Because the benefit of deterring police conduct by
extending the exclusionary rule to third parties would not outweigh the cost
Stewart, supra note 6, at 1367. According to Justice Stewart, when "the appellant's lawyer
was asked [during oral argument] whether he was requesting the Court to overrule the Wolf
case ... , [h]e answered, quite candidly, that he had never heard of the Wolf case." Stewart,
supra note 6, at 1367.
98. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655-56. The Court referred to exclusion as a "constitutional
privilege." Id. at 656.
99. Id. at 657.
100. Id. The majority contended the Fourth and Fifth Amendments had an "intimate
relation" and complimented each other: "[T]ogether they assure ... that no man is to be
convicted on unconstitutional evidence." Id. Fifteen years later, the Court dismissed the
theory that a seizure of incriminating materials is within the scope of the Fifth Amendment.
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 473-74 (1976).
101. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659; see supra note 59 and accompanying text.
102. For commentary regarding this issue, see Lawrence Crocker, Can the Exclusionary
Rule Be Saved?, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 310, 314-23 (1993); Steven K. Sharpe &
John E. Fennelly, Massachusetts v. Sheppard: When the Keeper Leads the Flock Astray-A
Case of Good Faith or Harmless Error?, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 665, 671 (1984).
103. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
104. Id. at 636-40. The Court noted that the "purpose [of deterrence] will not at this late
date be served by the wholesale release of the guilty victims." Id. at 637.
105. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
106. Id. at 171-72. The United States engaged in illegal electronic surveillance, and the
petitioners were convicted on evidence gathered from that surveillance. Id. at 167-68.
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of allowing more guilty criminals to go free, the Court refused to extend the
rule.107
In United States v. Calandra,08 the Court refused to extend the
exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings."°  The Court summarily
rejected the idea that the Constitution required exculsion and declared the
excusionary rule a "judicially created remedy."" 0  Declining to recognize
any rationale for the exclusionary rule except that of deterrence, the Court
noted the rule should apply only when its application efficiently serves its
remedial objectives."' Following the pattern of Alderman, the Court applied
a cost-benefit analysis to determine that the deterrence of police misconduct
did not warrant applying a rule that would unduly interfere with the role of
the grand jury." 2
The Court, in Stone v. Powell,"3 limited the ability of prisoners to
receive habeas corpus relief based on a violation of the Fourth
Amendment."' This decision dismissed the "judicial integrity" rationale for
the exclusionary rule, finding deterrence the primary justification for the
rule's existence." 5  According to the Stone majority, the benefits of
preserving judicial integrity did not outweigh the costs of excluding relevant
evidence." 6 The Court continued to use the cost-benefit analysis in later
cases. 117
107. Id. at 174-75; see also Stewart, supra note 6, at 1390.
108. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
109. Id. at 354. A witness before the grand jury must answer questions based on
evidence gathered in an illegal search. Id.
110. Id. at 348 ("[T]he rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth
Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional
right of the party aggrieved."); see also Stewart, supra note 6, at 1390 ("With that one
sentence [quoted above], the Court seemed to settle the question of the rule's constitutional
basis.").
11. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348.
112. Id. at 350-51. The Court said questioning witnesses based on illegally seized
evidence is a "derivative use" of the evidence and is not a further violation of the
Constitution. Id. at 354.
113. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
114. Id. at 489-96.
[W]here the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a
Fourth Amendment claim, the Constitution does not require that a state prisoner
be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in
an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.
Id. at 482.
115. Id. at 485-86. This reasoning shows a shift in the Court's analysis which led to the
good faith exceptions discussed in part III.G. of this note.
16. Id. at 485.
117. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984) ("[T]he balancing
approach that has evolved during the years of experience with the rule provides strong
support for the [creation of a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule].").
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G. The Good Faith Exceptions
Throughout the twentieth century, the Supreme Court created several
exceptions to the exclusionary rule, including the impeachment," 8 attenua-
tion,"' independent source, 20 and inevitable discovery12 ' exceptions. In the
years following the Mapp decision, many commentators also advocated a
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.22 The Court did not address
the issue, however, until '1983, in United States v. Leon.1
23
In Leon, the Court found favor with the cost-benefit analysis of its prior
post-Mapp cases such as Alderman.124 In a six-to-three decision, the Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision to suppress drugs found in the
execution of a facially valid search warrant.' If officers reasonably rely on
a search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate, the Court found that
prosecutors may use the evidence seized in the search even if the warrant
subsequently is found unsupported by probable cause.
126
118. In Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954), the Court held that prosecutors may
use illegally seized evidence to attack the defendant's credibility.
119. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939) (permitting courts to admit the
evidence if the causal connection between the illegal search and the evidence is sufficiently
"attenuated").
120. See supra note 66; but see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487 (1963)
(ruling that narcotics discovered through statements made by an illegally arrested defendant
did not fall under the independent source exception).
121. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (admitting evidence regarding the murder
victim's body, despite the illegal questioning of the defendant which led to its discovery,
because a search party would inevitably have discovered the body).
122. See, e.g., William A. Schroder, Deterring Fourth Amendment Violations:
Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1412-21 (1981); Frederick A.
Bernardi, The Exclusionary Rule: Is a Good Faith Standard Needed to Preserve a Liberal
Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment?, 30 DEPAUL L. REv. 51 (1980); Charles Alan
Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free if the Constable Blunders?, 50 TEx. L. REv. 736 (1972).
123. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Prior to Leon, the Fifth Circuit adopted a "good faith"
exception to the exclusionary rule. See United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 846-47 (5th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981).
124. Leon, 468 U.S. at 913. The Court noted it must consider the "sometimes competing
goals of . . . deterring official misconduct and removing inducements to unreasonable
invasions of privacy and... establishing procedures under which criminal defendants are
'acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth."' Id. at 900-
01 (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 175 (1969)).
125. Id. at 902-05. The Burbank Police Department received information from a
"confidential informant of unproven reliability" concerning possible illegal activities of the
respondents. Id. at 901. Based on this information, the police began surveillance of the
defendants' properties and subsequently applied for and received a search warrant. They
found cocaine, in varying quantities, at all of the defendants' residences. Id. at 902. After
determining that the informant was not credible and the warrants were not based upon
probable cause, the Ninth Circuit suppressed the evidence. Id. at 904-05.
126. Id. at 927 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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The Leon Court advanced three reasons courts should not apply the
exclusionary rule to deter judicial misconduct.'27 The Court found no
evidence that exclusion would deter unconstitutional judicial conduct. 28 The
Court also saw no indication that judges and magistrates tended to disregard
or violate the Fourth Amendment or that judicial misconduct was so
pervasive as to warrant the "extreme sanction" of the exclusionary rule.'2 9
In addition, the rule was designed only to deter police misconduct. 3 0
Although the Court found police misconduct rarely existed when an
officer relied on a search warrant,' the majority listed some limits to its
holding. If the judge abandoned his neutral status in issuing the warrant, the
police officer could not rely reasonably on the warrant, and suppression
would be the appropriate remedy. 3 2 The same is true if the officers
intentionally or recklessly alleged false information in an affidavit in support
of the warrant. 33 Finally, if the officers could not reasonably have believed
that probable cause existed, the court may suppress the evidence. 
13
In the companion case of Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 35 the Court
refused to exclude evidence collected in reliance on a search warrant later
ruled invalid. 36 Since the Leon and Sheppard decisions, the courts have
expanded the good faith exceptions.'37 Arizona v. Evans represents the most
recent expansion.
127. Id. at 916 (majority opinion).
128. Id. The Court noted "Oj]udges and magistrates are not adjuncts to the law
enforcement team" so they have no "stake" in @e outcome of their proceedings. Id. at 917.
Furthermore, the Court suggested that possible removal of the magistrates by the district
courts is a more effective "remedy" for constitutional violations than exclusion of evidence.
Id. at 917-18 n.18.
129. Id. at 916.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 921.
132. Id. at 923.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 926.
135. 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
136. Id. at 989-90. The warrant in Sheppard failed to specify the items sought. Id. at
987 n.2.
137. See, e.g., Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) (determining that an officer's
reasonable reliance on a statute later deemed unconstitutional falls within the good faith
exception); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (holding fruits of INS agents'
illegal searches admissible in deportation proceedings); see also United States v. Jackson, 825
F.2d 853 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom Browning v. United States, 484 U.S. 1019
(1988) (admitting evidence seized in reliance on a court decision later ruled unconstitutional).
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IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
After establishing jurisdiction over the case, Justice Rehnquist, writing
for the majority, set the stage for a Leon cost-benefit analysis by noting that
only the initial unlawful search violates the Fourth Amendment, so the use
of illegally seized evidence is not a new violation. 3' Because the Constitu-
tion does not expressly forbid the use of evidence collected in an illegal
search, the Court stated that the exclusionary rule does not apply to all
Fourth Amendment violations.'39 The Court reasoned the exclusionary rule
should apply only when its application would further a single objec-
tive-deterrence of police violations of the Fourth Amendment.140
Evans relied on United States v. Hensley
4' and Whiteley v. Warden142
to argue that a Fourth Amendment violation required suppression of the
evidence.143 The Court stated the issue in Hensley was whether there was
a Fourth Amendment violation at all, not whether the exclusionary rule
should apply.' In addition, although the Whiteley Court indicated the
exclusionary rule should apply to all Fourth Amendment violations, the
138. Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 1191 (1995). The Court noted: "The wrong
condemned by the [Fourth] Amendment is 'fully accomplished' by the unlawful search or
seizure itself." Id. (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974)). With this
quotation from Calandra, Justice Rehnquist showed the majority's support for deterrence as
the foundation of the exclusionary rule. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
Some critics of the good faith exception argue that separating the right from the
remedy allows courts to decide motions to suppress without determining whether a Fourth
Amendment violation has occurred, thereby impeding the development of Fourth Amendment
law. See, e.g., Joan G. Levenson, Comment, The Good Faith Exception: Should It Enable
Courts to Avoid Explication of Underlying Fourth Amendment Issues?, 52 BROOK. L. REV.
799 (1986); William J. Mertens & Silas Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the
Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365 (1981).
139. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 119 1. The decision to apply the exclusionary rule is totally
separate from the determination that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred. Id.
140. Id.
141. 469 U.S. 221 (1985).
142. 401 U.S. 560 (1971).
143. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1192. Comparing police reliance on an erroneous radio
transmission, which demanded suppression in Whiteley, to reliance on a computer record in
Evans, the respondent argued that law enforcement agencies are the only ones who have
access to "criminal information systems" and thus have the responsibility for their accuracy.
Brief of Respondent at 6-7, Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995) (No. 93-1660).
Respondent also compared Evans with Hensley. Id. at 21-22. In Hensley, the arresting
officers relied on another police department's wanted poster to arrest the defendant. The
Court noted, because the flier was based on a reasonable suspicion, the arrest was valid;
however, if the flier had not been supported by probable cause, the arrest would not have
been valid. Hensley, 469 U.S. at 230. The Hensley Court stated that the admissibility of
evidence collected during the arrest depends on whether probable cause for that arrest
existed. Id. at 235.
144. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1192.
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Evans majority rejected this contention and found the application of the rule
dependent on its value as a deterrent.
45
The majority then reaffirmed its Leon holding and analyzed the case
according to the Leon framework. 46 It noted the exclusionary rule was
created to deter misconduct of the police, not court employees. 47 Because
the respondent did not offer evidence that court employees habitually
violated the Fourth Amendment, the Court found the "extreme sanction" of
the exclusionary rule unwarranted in this case. 48  Most importantly, the
Court found no evidence that applying the exclusionary rule to a situation
in which court employees were responsible for a computer error would deter
future misconduct. 49 Concluding that thie police officers who arrested Evans
behaved reasonably, 5' the majority reasoned exclusion would deter no
police misconduct in this case.''
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Souter and Breyer, concurred with
the majority's opinion that courts should apply the exclusionary rule only
145. Id. at 1192-93 (citing Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987); Massachusetts v.
Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); United States
v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1984)). These cases use a cost-benefit analysis, emphasizing the
rule's deterrent power rather than its Constitutional basis. See parts III.F. and III.G. of this
note for a discussion of the cost-benefit cases.
146. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1193. See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Leon factors.
147. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1193. For commentary on deterring only police misconduct,
see Donald Dripps, Living With Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906 (1986).
148. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1193. For commentary on the cost-benefit analysis, see Wayne
R. LaFave, The Seductive Call of Expediency: United States v. Leon, Its Rationale and
Ramifications, U. ILL. L. REv. 1984, at 895, 903-11 (1984) (arguing that the Leon Court
exaggerated the costs and diminished the benefits of the exclusionary rule); Albert W.
Alschuler, "Close Enough For Government Work": The Exclusionary Rule After Leon, 7
SuP. CT. REv. 309, 346-51 (1984) (discussing the difficulty in weighing "tangible" costs
against "speculative" benefits). Alschuler also criticized the exemption of "every magistrate,
however lawless, from direct judicial review but [of] no police officer, however decent." Id.
at 357. He contends that remedial measures that apply to police officers should also apply
to others who authorize searches and seizures. Id. at 358.
149. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1193. The Court reasoned that the possibility of exclusion
would not deter these employees from keeping erroneous records, because the clerks
responsible for the erroneous records were not involved in the arrest. Id. (citing United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 917 (1984)).
150. For excellent discussions of the objective good faith determination, see LaFave,
supra note 148, and Alschuler, supra note 148, discussing the difficulty of determining
reasonableness.
151. Evans, 115 S.Ct. at 1193-94. With one sentence, the majority dismissed the
limitations found in the Leon decision: "There is no indication that the arresting officer was
not acting objectively reasonably when he relied upon the police computer record." Id. at




to deter police misconduct.'52 Nevertheless, the concurrence noted that
police officers may be negligent in relying on a record keeping system that
contains "no mechanism to ensure its accuracy over time." '153 Justice
O'Connor compared the reliability of a computer system with that of police
informants.' Just as information from an unreliable informant does not
constitute probable cause for arrest, information from an unreliable record
keeping system would not do so.' Therefore, according to Justice
O'Connor, police may not rely "blindly" on a computerized record keeping
system.1
56
Justice Stevens dissented from the holding of the majority. 157 He stated
that the exclusionary rule, like the Fourth Amendment itself, protects
individuals from all unlawful searches and seizures, not merely those
conducted by the police.'58 The dissent further argued that the police
department was "part of the chain of information" which resulted in Evans's
illegal arrest, so applying the exclusionary rule in this case could encourage
police departments to develop more effective procedures for communication
with court employees."' Justice Stevens disagreed that preventing the
prosecution of a crime was a greater "cost" to society than the "offense to
the dignity of the citizen who is arrested, handcuffed, and searched on a
public street simply because some bureaucrat has failed to maintain an
accurate computer data base."' 
60
152. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1194 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
153. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
154. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). When the police rely on information from an
informant to establish probable cause for an arrest or search, they must prove the credibility
of the informant. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 508-22 (1978). Justice O'Connor noted, "where an informant
provides information about certain criminal activities but does not specify the basis for his
knowledge, a finding of probable cause based on that information will not be upheld unless
the informant is 'known for [his] unusual reliability"' and stated that a record keeping
system's reliability "deserves no less scrutiny than that of informants." Evans, 115 S. Ct.
at 1194 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)).
155. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1194 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
156. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
157. Id. at 1195 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also joined Justice Ginsburg's
dissent, which advocated dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 1197-98 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
158. Id. at 1195 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 1196 (Stevens, J., dissenting).




In Arizona v. Evans, the majority opinion did not address the limiting
factors of the Leon decision. 6' Instead, the Court made the issue of whether
court employees could have been responsible for the computer error
determinative of whether to apply the exclusionary rule.' 62 The Court's
analysis did not address the prime concern of the Supreme Court of
Arizona-the notion that computer errors in police files could haunt even
the average noncriminal citizen.
163
Although Justice O'Connor suggests the Evans decision determined
only whether a court must apply the exclusionary rule to deter judicial mis-
conduct,"6 lower courts may use the decision to create a blanket exception
allowing police officers to rely on erroneous computer files with no
determination of whether this reliance is reasonable. In addition, the
decision gave no guidance to the lower courts as to when reliance on a
computer system may be unreasonable.'
65
The Evans decision also called into question the "fellow officer rule.""IM
Under this rule, a police officer who receives information that another law
enforcement agency has issued a warrant for the suspect's arrest may make
a legal arrest based upon the authority of that warrant.1 67 If a court later
determines that the original warrant was not supported by probable cause,
161. See supra notes 132-34, 15 1.
162. Evans, 115 S.Ct. at 1194 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he Court limits itself to
the question whether a court employee's [error] ... is the kind of error to which the
exclusionary rule should apply.").
163. The Arizona Supreme Court called this the "potential for Orwellian mischief." State
v. Evans, 866 P.2d 869, 872 (Ariz. 1994); see supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 162.
165. See People v. Downing, 33 Cal. App. 4th 1641 (1995). An officer conducted a
warrantless search of Downing's apartment because the police department's computer showed
he was subject to a Fourth Amendment search waiver. Id. at 179. The officer found a pipe
bomb and "various parts for making pipe bombs." Id. The waiver had, in fact, expired, but
the San Diego Superior Court had not updated the computer records. Id. at 180. The court
relied on Evans and refused to exclude the evidence. Id. at 187 ("[l]n this fast-paced,
computerized society, it is absurd to require a police officer to exhaust all avenues of
investigation and corroboration when he has no objective reason to question facially valid
computer data produced by other than the collective law enforcement department in front of
him."). However, the court did note, without elaboration, that reliance on a computer system
that the police department knows is flawed may be unreasonable. Id. at 187 n.26.
166. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1192. The Court questioned the Whiteley v. Warden holding
which created the rule by stating: "In Whiteley, the Court treated identification of a Fourth
Amendment violation as synonymous with application of the exclusionary rule to evidence
secured incident to that violation .... Subsequent case law has rejected this reflexive
application of the exclusionary rule." Id. (citing Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971)).
For an excellent discussion of Whiteley, see LAFAVE, supra note 154, at 622-31.
167. LAFAVE, supra note 154, at 623-24.
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the arrest is invalid and evidence discovered incident to the arrest is
suppressed. 168 Because Evans clearly found fault with the automatic
exclusion of evidence discovered in an illegal arrest, lower courts may read
the decision as creating a "good faith" exception to the fellow officer rule.'69
Like Leon, this opinion may place a "premium on police ignorance,"'
70
encouraging police to remain wilfully ignorant of the quality of their
computer systems. If the officers do not know whether the system is
accurate, they cannot be accused of acting in bad faith. Furthermore, this
ruling may encourage police departments to turn over their record keeping
to court employees to avoid suppression of evidence in the event of an
erroneous record.
Finally, the Evans decision brings to the forefront an issue that both
proponents and opponents of the exclusionary rule must address-what is
the remedy, other than exclusion, for a Fourth Amendment violation? For
the prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment to have meaning, there must be
some remedy for a violation. 7' Some scholars suggest allowing civil
actions against the government for violations.172 Others note, however, that
new remedies requiring legislative action would have their own set of
accompanying problems.'73 Legislatures are political animals and may not
be willing to create new remedies for illegal searches and seizures. 74 Juries
168. LAFAVE, supra note 154, at 624, 626 n.35 and accompanying text.
169. See State v. Mayorga, 901 S.W.2d 943, 945 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (citing Evans
for the proposition that the exclusionary rule "does not apply in cases in which an arresting
officer is reasonably acting upon information provided to him which is later found to be
erroneous"). But see State v. White, 660 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1995). During a computer check
on a routine tFaffic stop, the arresting officers' computer indicated an outstanding arrest
warrant for White. Id. at 665. The officers arrested White and discovered contraband during
a search incident to that arrest. Id. Because the warrant had been quashed four days prior
to the arrest, the trial court suppressed the evidence. Id. The Florida Supreme Court
affirmed, distinguishing Evans by charging the arresting officers with knowledge that the
warrant had been quashed under the "fellow officer" rule. Id. at 667.
170. See Leigh A. Morrissey, Note, State Courts Reject Leon on State Constitutional
Grounds: A Defense of Reactive Rulings, 47 VAND. L. REV. 917, 930 (1994) (noting that
Leon places a "premium on police ignorance of the law because evidence seized under an
invalid warrant generally will be admissible," so police can rely on the judge's determination
instead of deciding whether the law allows the search). See also Leon, 468 U.S. at 955
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (predicting that "police departments will be encouraged to train
officers that if a warrant has simply been signed, it is reasonable, without more, to rely on
it").
171. Stewart, supra note 6, at 1397.
172. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV.
757, 812-14 (1994) (advocating strict liability on behalf of the government for the actions
of its officers).
173. See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 820 (1994).
174. Id. at 848-49. See also Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives On The Fourth
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may also be unwilling to award sufficient monetary damages to deter
unconstitutional searches and seizures.'75
Even the Office of Legal Policy's recent Report to the Attorney
General, which advocates doing away with the rule altogether, according to
commentators, fails to suggest an existing remedy as an adequate substitute
for the exclusionary rule. 76 The report suggests criminal prosecutions as an
alternative remedy while acknowledging they would be ineffective as a
deterrent because most police officers who commit constitutional violations
are not criminally culpable.'77 The report also suggests establishing review
boards to discipline police officers who violate the constitution but admits
that the officers could raise their good faith as an affirmative defense. 78
During a discussion of the existing options for civil damage suits
against those who execute an unlawful search, the report notes that none
offer a satisfactory system for remedying violations. 79 Acting in good faith
is a defense to all civil damage remedies, and, with the Supreme Court's
expansion of the good faith exceptions to the exclusionary rule, good faith
is also becoming a defense to exclusion. 8 1 The use of good faith as a
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 378-79 (1974) (stating that the "mounting hysteria" about
increasing crime rates means that "[l]egislatures have not been, are not now, and are not
likely to become sensitive to the concern of protecting persons under investigation by the
police").
175. Steiker, supra note 173, at 850 ("[P]ublic support for unrestrained police power not
only makes the passage of remedial legislation extremely unlikely, it also suggests that, even
if such legislation were to be passed, popular juries would be unwilling to find much police
conduct 'unreasonable."'). Steiker attributes much of this public support to the fact that the
average citizen is always more afraid of the "robbers" than the "cops." Steiker, supra note
173, at 850.
176. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, REPORT TO THE ATIORNEY GENERAL ON THE SEARCH AND
SEIZURE EXCLUSIONARY RULE (1986), reprinted in Truth in Criminal Justice Series, 22 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 573, 635 (1989). See Schroeder, supra note 122, at 1386-1412 (commenting
on the limitations of existing remedies other than exclusion).
177. See REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 176, at 621. Most violations
"appear to involve mistakes of law or fact, rather than willful or malicious conduct, on the
part of law enforcement officers." REPORT TO THE ATrORNEY GENERAL, supra note 176, at
621. It is likely that willful or malicious violations would not be made in good faith in the
first place, so they might result in exclusion under the current legal scheme.
178. REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 176, at 624.
179. REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 176, at 625-31 (discussing the
limitations of Bivens actions, Federal Tort Claims Act Suits, 18 U.S.C. § 2520 claims, and
42 U.S.C. § 1983 suits).
180. REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 176, at 648. The report offered
this statement as a reason to abolish the exclusionary rule, because, with further good faith
exceptions, the remedies will overlap.
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defense leaves defendants such as Isaac Evans without a remedy.' Thus,
the Evans decision may force the United States Supreme Court, or lower
courts, to create other remedies for Fourth Amendment violations.
Elisa Masterson White
181. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 6, at 1397 (stating that all violations of the
Constitution must have a remedy, even if the violation was committed in good faith).
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